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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

conditional water right and that a conditional water right does not
expire without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration
under section 305(7).
Thus, even though the Ranch failed to file its application for a
finding of reasonable diligence, the water court improperly canceled
the conditional water right by failing to provide the Ranch with the
required statutory notice that its conditional water right would expire
or be cancelled. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and
directed the water court to allow the Ranch to file an application for
finding of reasonable diligence.
Mark Shea

West Elk Ranch v. United States, No. 02SA93, 2002 WL 31681910
(Colo. Dec. 2, 2002) (holding a party cannot show they "can and will"
put water to a beneficial use if they have not obtained, and there is no
evidence the party will obtain, the required permits to use the United
States National Forest).
West Elk Ranch ("West Elk") sought a conditional water right to a
spring adjacent to their property on the United States National Forest
in the water court for Water Division No. 4. The United States Forest
Service ("USFS") denied West Elk's application for a Special Use
Permit ("SUP") to capture water and divert it to their property.
Therefore, the water court granted summary judgment to the USFS
and denied the conditional water right request because West Elk did
not meet the conditional water right "can and will" requirement. West
Elk appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court claiming they would
eventually obtain an SUP, however, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision.
West Elk's predecessor in interest applied for a conditional water
right to use Bear Gulch Spring, located on the national forest, for
stock watering and domestic use. The Department of Justice filed a
statement of opposition to the petition because West Elk had not
obtained an SUP and the USFS expressed concerns over the project's
environmental effects. Ultimately, after filing SUP applications, the
USFS denied West Elk's application due to environmental concerns.
The water court found that West Elk could not and would not put the
water to beneficial use without an SUP from the USFS; therefore, it did
not meet the conditional water right "can and will" requirement. After
the USFS filed a summary judgment motion, the court denied West
Elk's application and granted summary judgment in favor of the USFS.
On appeal, the supreme court first reviewed the definition of
conditional water rights. A conditional water right is perfected when
the holder of a right with priority finalizes their appropriation with
reasonable diligence.
The application must establish that the
applicant has taken the "first step" towards perfecting his right and
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illustrate how the applicant "can and will" finalize the appropriation.
The court then reviewed the FW case where FWS and the
Colorado Division of Wildlife ("DOW") owned adjacent submerged
property. FWS wanted a conditional right to expand its storage right,
however, DOW would not grant permission to submerge more land
and expand the storage capacity of the lakes. Therefore, the FWS
court did not grant FWS a conditional right because they did not
obtain permission to enlarge the lake and, therefore, could not put
water to a beneficial use.
West Elk argued the present case was analogous to In re Gibbs
where Gibbs requested a conditional right to withdraw water from a
well located on adjacent property. The well property owner had not
granted access permission. In granting a conditional right, the In re
Gibbs court did not require such permission at the time of the decree
because Gibbs illustrated she could gain access to the well through a
prior easement or private condemnation.
The court found this case more factually similar to WS than In re
Gibbs because the USFS did not grant West Elk an SUP, nor was there
evidence that it would grant an SUP in the future. Thus, absent an
SUP, West Elk could not and would not put water from Bear Gulch
Spring to beneficial use. In finding the water court properly granted
summary judgment, the supreme court concluded there was no
question of material fact and West Elk could not meet the "can and
will" requirement.
Holly Kirsner

CONNECTICUT
Ace Equip. Sales v. Buccino, 797 A.2d 516 (Conn. 2002) (holding that
a pond originally created by damming a natural stream is treated
under the law in the same way as a natural pond with respect to
riparian rights and that owners of abutting land are presumed to
possess riparian rights in the adjoining pond).
Ace Equipment Sales ("Ace") initiated this suit in the Superior
Court of Connecticut seeking an injunction to bar Thomas and Irma
Buccino ("Buccino") from entering onto or using Hall's Pond for
recreational purposes, and a declaratory judgment that Buccino
owned no part of the pond bed. Buccino claimed ownership of a sliver
of subaqueous land at the base of the pond dam and sought a
declaratory judgment regarding that boundary and an injunction to
enforce their right to use the pond and removal of a fence, erected by
Ace, which barricaded their right-of-way. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Buccino and denied Ace's motion. The issue of
the precise location of the boundary between Buccino's land and that

